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ADMISSION AND USE OF EVIDENCE IN THE
CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS
The admission into evidence of a confession obtained without warning an
accused minor of his constitutional rights does not require the reversal of a
juvenile court judgmentin California. Thls is the decision reached in the recent
case of In re Castro.' While in police custody the minor made a series of con-
fessions without receiving the warnings of Ins constitutional rights required by
People v. Dorado2 and Miranda v. Arizona.8 The confessions were admitted into
evidence at a juvenile court hearing and the minor appealed, seeking reversal of
the juvenile court judgment determining him to be a ward of the court.
The Castro court recognized that the disputed confessions would be madmis-
sible at a crminal trial,4 but concluded that since the juvenile court was not a
criminal court the exclusionary rule had no application.5 Yet the court held that
the confessions must be completely disregarded by the judge in determining
whether the minor was to be declared a ward of the juvenile court.6 The court
found sufficient evidence, without the confessions, to support the judgment.7
Shortly after the Castro decision a similar ruling was made in In re Acuna.8
Citing Castro as authority, the court held that the failure to warn a minor of
his constitutional rights prior to interrogation did not render his subsequent
confession inadmissible.o The court agreed that the juvenile court judge must
disregard the disputed confession, but found substantial evidence to support
the juvenile court judgment.'0
1243 A.C.A. 467, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966).
262 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965).
a 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The case holds that when an individual is taken into cus-
tody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities he must be warned prior
to any questioning of his right to remain silent and of his right to the presence of an
attorney or to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent. In the absence of such
warnings, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation may be used against
hun. Id. at 478-79.
4 In re Castro, 243 A.C.A. 467, 471, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469, 471 (1966). "It is clear
that if tis had been a criminal trial there was an absence of the proof required of the
state prior to the introduction of the confessions "Ibid.
5 Id. at 471, 474, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 471, 473.
6 Id. at 476, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
7 Id. at 476-77, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 474-75. The appellate court found independent
evidence to support only one of the two counts of arson on which the juvenile court
judgment was based. Ibid. In re Buros, 57 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1967), decided as this issue
went to press, reversed a juvenile court judgment based on a confession obtained without
warning a minor of his constitutional rights. Unlike Castro, the juvenile court judgment
was based solely on the illegally obtained confession.
8245 A.C.A. 423, 53 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1966).
9 Id. at 427-28, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 886. "The confession of petitioner, being the result
of an interrogation that lent itself to eliciting mcrimnating statements from him, would
clearly come within the proscription of Dorado, Escobedo and Miranda if the juvenile
court proceeding was a criminal trial." Id. at 426-27, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
10 Id. at 428, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87. "The question before us as an appellate court
is whether there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court judge's determina-
tion that a preponderance of the evidence existed exclusive of the confession of peti-
tioner." Id. at 428, 53 Cal. Rpt. at 887.
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At first reading, the decisions reached in Castro and Acuna seem internally
inconsistent. First it is held that the exclusionary rules of evidence laid down
in Dorado and Miranda do not apply in juvenile court proceedings; then it is
decided that the juvenile court ]udge must disregard the confessions since they
would not have been admissible at a criminal trial. This note will explore the
reasons for this seemingly anomalous conclusion and attempt to evaluate its
validity as a rule of evidence in the juvenile courts." In the process, some atten-
tion will be given to the history of the juvenile courts, the background of the
California juvenile court law, and the current interest in protecting the legal
and constitutional rights of juveniles.
The California Juvenile Court Hearing
The Castro and Acuna decisions are based on the California juvenile court law
adopted in 196112 and can best be explained by reference to the pertinent
sections.
The juvenile court hearing is a two-stage proceeding. The first part of the
hearing is for the purpose of establishing the jurisdiction of the court over the
minor.13 Section 701 of the Welfare and Institutions Code sets out the questions
to be resolved during the jurisdictional stage of the hearing. Three separately
defined bases of jurisdiction are involved. Depending on the allegations of the
petition, the court must decide at this point if the minor is: 1) a person described
in section 600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code-a neglected or dependent
minor;14 2) a person described in section 601 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
-a minor showing a tendency toward delinquency; 15 or 3) a person described
in section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code-a minor who has committed
what would be a crime if he were an adult.16
This jurisdictional stage of the hearing is essentially a fact finding proceeding.
For example, in the case of a minor described by section 602 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code, the basic question before the court is whether the minor
has committed a criminal act listed in that section. Once it has been found that
11 Detailed discussion of whether minors before the juvenile court should be pro-
tected by all the constitutional safeguards available to criminal defendants is beyond
the scope of this note. However, a general discussion of the current controversy on this
subject may be found at notes 39-46 rnfra and accompanying text.
12 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CoDE §§ 500-914.
13 CAL. WE-P. & INsTs ConE § 701.
14 CAL. WEr. & INsT'Ns CODE § 600. This category includes destitute and aban-
doned minors and those dangerous to the public because of deficiency or abnormality.
Ibid.
15 CAL. WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE § 601. This category includes minors who are habit-
ually truant from school, habitually disobedient to parents or school authorities, or are
in danger of leading idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral lives. Ibid.
1 6 CAL. WELF. & INsTNs CODE § 602. A minor described by this section includes
one who has violated a local or state law or one who has previously been found a per-
son described in § 601 and has failed to obey an order of the juvenile court. Ibid.
One court has explained: "Section 701 is merely a procedural statute for making
a judicial finding of fact that the minor is a person described by sections 600, 601 or
602. If the court finds that the minor has committed the alleged crime this is only a
finding which vests jurisdiction in the juvenile court under section 602 and the court
may then make the minor a ward of the court." In re Johnson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 37, 39,
38 Cal. Rptr. 405, 406 (1964).
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a minor is a person described by the appropnate section of the law, he can
be declared a ward of court. The second part of the hearing is then directed to
the proper disposition of the mnnor.17
-Section 701 of the Welfare and Institutions Code also describes the evidence
that may be admitted and used during the first or jurisdictional stage of the
hearing. Any evidence is admissible if it is relevant and material to the circum-
stances or acts alleged to bring the minor within the jurisdiction of the court.1s
However, not all evidence admitted at the jurisdictional stage of the hearing
may be used to support the finding of the court. When the question of ]unsdic-
tion involves a minor described in section 600 or section 601 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code, a preponderance of evidence legally admissible in the trial of
civil cases must be adduced to support the finding.19 Similarly, when the jursdic-
tional question concerns a minor described in section 602 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code, a preponderance of evidence legally admissible in the trial
of criminal cases must be adduced to support the finding of the court.20 At the
second or dispositional phase of the hearing all relevant and material evidence may
be admitted and there are no limitations as to what evidence may be used to
support the order of the court.21
In Castro2 2 the petition alleged that the minor had committed what would
have been a crime if he had been an adult23 and that he was therefore a minor
within the description of section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Since
the disputed confession would not have been legally admissible at a criminal
trial, the decision correctly interprets section 701 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code in holding that the juvenile court judge was required to disregard the con-
fession.24
Nature of the juvenile Court Proceeding
The Castro25 and Acuna26 courts concluded that the juvenile court proceeding
was not a criminal trial. This is expressly provided in section 503 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code: "An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile
court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a
proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding." The federal
courts and each of the fifty states have adopted and endorsed this theory of the
17 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 702,706.
18 CAL. WELp. & INST'NS CODE § 701.
'9 Ibid.
20 Ibid. Section 701 further provides that when a minor denies an extra-judicial
admission or confession, the court may continue the hearing for up to seven days so that
the probation officer may subpoena witnesses to prove the allegations of the petition. Ibid.
2 1 CAL. WELl. & INsT'Ns CODE: § 706.
22 In re Castro, 243 A.C.A. 467, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966).
2 3 The alleged crime was arson.
24 An authority on California evidence law agrees: "[Ilncompetent evidence which
has been admitted must be disregarded by the judge and by the reviewing court in
reaching a decision." Wrrmx, CAxaxon A EvmENcE § 18, at 21 (2d ed. 1966).
25 In re Castro, 243 A.C.A. 467, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966).
2 6 In re Acuna, 245 A.C.A. 423, 53 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1966).
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noncrinmal nature of the juvenile court proceeding,27 and it has long been recog-
nized and supported in California decmons.28
Since juvenile court proceedings are nonerminal, the California courts have
limited the application of those specific protections that would surround the
accused at a criminal trial. For example, the right to trial by jury29 and the right
to baila3 have been held not to apply in the juvenile courts. It has also been held
that a juvenile court judge need not advise a minor of the privilege against
self-mcrimmation.3 1 A preponderance of evidence, rather than proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, has been held sufficient to support a juvenile court ]udg-
ment.3 2 The Castro and Acuna decisions, the latest rulings based on the non-
crininal nature of the juvenile court, held that since the juvenile court is not a
crimnal court the admission into evidence of confessions obtained in derogation
of constitutional rights does not require the reversal of a juvenile court judg-
ment.3 3
The juvenile courts m the United States were established as a result of a
reform movement which began early in the twentieth century 3 4 The philosophy
of the juvenile courts is grounded on the premise that the state stands in the
role of parens patrzae toward the wayward minor who is made a ward of the
state.3 5 The state, according to this widely accepted theory, is concerned with
the welfare of the child and will provide corrective care and supervision to
the end that he may become a useful citizen. In the process, crmuinal stigma
will be avoided and the minor will be spared the traumatic experience of a
criminal trial. The theory of the noncriminal nature of the juvenile court proceed-
mg has developed from this basic philosophy.3 6
Despite the wide acceptance of the theory and function of the juvenile courts,
2 7 See, e.g., Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959). An appendix
beginning at page 561 of the case indicates that all fifty states by statute or decision
have held juvenile court proceedings to be noncriminal.
28 E.g., People v. Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956); In re Daedler, 194
Cal. 320, 228 Pac. 467 (1924); In re Johnson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 37, 38 Cal. Rptr. 405
(1964); In re Schubert, 153 Cal. App. 2d 138, 313 P.2d 968 (1957); In re Dargo,
81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P.2d 282 (1947).29 In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 Pac. 467 (1924); People ex rel. Weber v.
Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955).80 In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952).
11In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P.2d 282 (1947). But cf. In re Tahbel,
46 Cal. App. 755, 189 Pac. 804 (1920). "In practice, however, all juvenile courts in
California allow the youth to assert the pnvilege in response to incriminating ques-
tions " Note, The California Juvenile Court, 10 STAN. L. REv. 471, 498 (1958).
8 In re Jobnson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 37, 38 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1964).
88 See text at notes 4, 5, 9 supra.
8 4The first juvenile court act was passed Illinois m 1899. Psnxris, Crumur,. LAw
733 (1957).
35 For a discussion of the philosophy of the juvenile courts see Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966).
36 For an excellent discussion of the development of the juvenile court concept see
3 CAL. LAw REVISION Coi.MtN, REPORTS, PECOmLEN ATIONS & STuniEs E27 (1961).
See generally Pa~xaNs, CiMiniN. LAw 733 (1957); Note, The Parents Patriae Theory
and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 894 (1966).
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there has been increasing concern with the actual performance of the juvenile
system, and a growing interest in protecting the legal rights of the child before
the court.37 In recent years a number of decisions have particularly emphasized
the requirements of fairness and procedural due process in juvenile adjudications,
while still accepting the basic premise that the juvenile courts are noncrmnnal. 88
Additionally, there has been a strong undercurrent of scholarly and judicial dis-
cussion proposing that juveniles brought to court because of criminal activity be
granted all of the constitutional protections accorded an adult in similar circum-
stances.8 9
In Kent v. United States,40 the Supreme Court of the United States recognized
recent critiques of the actual operation of the juvenile court system.4 ' Speaking
for the court, Mr. Justice Fortas pointed out that:
[Tjhere may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.42
The opinion concluded that this recognized concern would not lead the court
to rule on the question of the application of constitutional guarantees to minors
before the juvenile court as proposed in an amncus curiae bnef.43
The Kent decision clearly does not resolve the conflict between those who
support the present juvenile court system and those who urge that juveniles
should be protected by all rights available to the criminal defendant. 44 To date
the exclusionary rules established by the United States Supreme Court is such
87 See, e.g., Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Courts, 7 CRMm &
DELInQuENcy 97 (1961); Paulsen, Fairness To The Juvenile Offender, 41 MWN. L.
RInv. 547 (1957); Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-Fundamental Fairness for the
Accused in a Quasi-Criminal Forum, 50 Minw. L. REv. 653 (1966); Note, Juvenile
Justice: Treatment or Travesty?, 11 U. Prir. L. RFv. 277 (1950).88 See, e.g., Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959); In re Alexander,
152 Cal. App. 2d 458, 313 P.2d 182 (1957); In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787,
241 P.2d 631 (1952); State v. Johnson, 141 Mont. 1, 374 P.2d 504 (1962).
89 See, e.g., In re Poff, 135 F Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955); People v. Dotson, 46
Cal. 2d 891, 899, 299 P.2d 875, 880 (1956) (Carter, f., dissenting opinion); Holmes'
Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 610, 109 A.2d 523, 528 (1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting opinion);
cert. dened, 348 U.S. 973 (1955); Antieau, Constitutional Rights In Juvenile Courts,
46 CowxmLL L.Q. 387 (1961); Gardner, A Challenge to Lawyers-The juvenile Court,
40 CAL. S.B.J. 349 (1965); Note, 7 SANTA CrAnA LAw. 114 (1966).
40 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
41 Id. at 555 (dictum).
42.1d. at 556 (dictum).
43 Ibid.
44 During the current term, the United States Supreme Court has before it Applica-
tion of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), prob. luru. noted, 384 U.S. 997 (1966).
The case is a direct challenge to the juvenile court law of Arizona. An anucus curiae brief
submitted by the American Parents Committee raises the issue of the constitutional
rights of minors in the juvenile court. "[Tihis case poses the overall question of whether
our constitutional law precepts will permit the operation of a system of social control,
parallel but distinct from criminal law, which will be free from the traditional formalities
and safeguards made applicable to the latter." Brief for the American Parents Committee
as Amicus Curiae, p. 3.
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decisions as Escobedo v. Illinos"45 and Miranda v. Arizona48 have not been um-
posed on the juvenile courts.
Evidence in the Califorma Juvenile Court:
Background and Comparison
No directives on the admission and use of evidence were included in the
code provisions which governed.Califorma juvenile court hearings before the
enactment of the 1961 law. The prior law required only that the court "proceed to
hear and dispose of the case in a summary manner."47
Yet, over the years juvenile court judges independently developed rules of
evidence for contested cases. In 1960, fifty-seven juvenile court judges were
canvassed by the Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice. Over
smty-six per cent of the judges reported that they applied relaxed criminal rules
of evidence in contested cases, while more than nineteen per cent used strict
criminal rules.48 Rules of evidence applicable in civil actions were employed
by less than four per cent of the judges.49
Section 701 of the Welfare aid Institutions Code as adopted in 1961 estab-
lished the first uniform requirements for the admission and use of evidence M
the juvenile courts of California. As noted, this section allows for the admission
of all relevant and material evidence at the jurisdictional or fact-finding stage
of the juvenile court hearmg.(0 Yet only evidence legally admissible at the trial
of other cases may be used to support the judgment of the court.51 A leading
authority on California evidence has called the evidentiary requirements of
section 701 "a virtually unprecedented system, under winch evidence is to be
freely admitted although it cannot be used to support a finding on the issue as to
which it was admitted."52
The basis of the unique evidence requirements of section 701 of the Welfare
45378 U.S. 478 (1964).
46 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
47 Cal. Stat. 1937, ch. 369, at 1037.4 8  ORT OF THE GovEnxon's SPEciAL STuDy Commssiox ON JuvmmE JusTICE
pt. 2, at 9 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 COmmissION REPORT].
49 Ibid. The remaining judges used liberal rules, combinations and other types of
rules. Ibid. A 1958 study showed that fifteen juvenile court judges applied strict
criminal rules of evidence, while twenty-three courts had relaxed the criminal rules to
varying degrees. Note, The California Juvenile Court, 10 STAx. L. REv. 471, 493 (1958).
Neither the comm,ssion report nor the Stanford study define "relaxed criminal rules."
50 For a complete description of the provision see text at notes 18-20 supra.
5 1 CAL. WEI-. & INsT'fs CODE. § 701. For the balance of this note, evidence not
admissible at other trials will be termed "incompetent" evidence.5 2 Address by B. E. Witkun, in PRocEmiNcs OF THE THm ANnuAL INS rrE FOE
JuvEmuai CouTR JUDGES Am REFE ES 127 (1964). In the same address, Mr. Witkm
classified the evidence that would have to be disregarded by the juvenile court judge
under the provisions of § 701 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. He listed involuntary
confessions and admissions, illegally obtained evidence, opinion and hearsay evidence.
Id. at 137-46. The need to disregard evidence obtained without warning a minor of
his constitutional rights was recognized by juvenile court judges at their 1966 institute.
PROCEEDiNGS OF THE 1966 INSTrrUTE FOR JUvENU E COuRT JuDGES AND lREmxRas at 3-4
(1966).
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and Institutions Code may be found in the report of the Governor's Special
Study Commission on Juvenile Justice. The juvenile court law adopted in 1961
is based in large part on the 1960 report of this commission, and section 701
is a modified form of a commission recommendation.53 In its report the commission
recognized the need for rules of evidence in the juvenile court,M but recom-
mended that such rules be used only as a test of the sufficiency of the evidence. 55
The commission specifically recommended that rules of evidence not be applied
to govern admissibility.56 The language of the report indicates that the commis-
sion thought this approach to evidence in the juvenile courts would preserve
the informal atmosphere of the court and encourage a minor's receptivity to treat-
ment.57-
The California juvenile court law can be compared with the New York law
enacted in 1962.58 As in California, the hearing process is divided. First a hearing
is required to find if a minor has committed an alleged criminal act or has be-
haved in a way which indicates that he is in need of supervision. 59 The second
hearing is concerned with the disposition of the minor.60 At the first hearing
only evidence that is competent, material and relevant may be admitted, and
the finding is based on a preponderance of such evidence. 61 Since competent
evidence generally means legally admissible evidence, the Castro2 and Acuna63
confessions would likely have been excluded from evidence in a New York
juvenile court. 64
The question of the admissibility of evidence obtained in derogation of con-
stitutional rights was considered by a New York Family Court in Matter of
Williams.65 The court applied the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio66 to evi-
5s 1960 CocmnissioN REPoRT pt. 1, at 73. The commission recommended that a
preponderance of evidence not subject to objection by competent counsel under the
rules of evidence observed in the trial of criminal cases be adduced to find jurisdiction.
Ibid.
54 "All of the reasons for employing rules of evidence in other judicial proceedings,
e.g., to insure truthful, reliable, and fair testimony, apply with equal force to a hearing
on a minor's delinquency "1960 ComnmssioN REPORT pt. 1, at 30.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
r7 Id. at 29-30. It has been suggested that the purpose of the juvenile court evidence
provision is to permit the use of "nonquality" evidence of probative value. Note, 1961
Californza Juvenile Court Law: 'Effective Uniform Standards for Juvenile Court Proce-
dure?, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 421, 443 (1963).
's N.Y. F nny CT. Acr (McKinney 1963).
59 N.Y. FA nLY CT. AcT § 742 (McKinney 1963).
60 N.Y. FAMMnY CT. ACT § 743 (McKinney 1963).
61 N.Y. FAnMMY CT. Acr.§ 744 (McKinney 1963).
62 In re Castro, 243 A.C.A. 467, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966).
63 In re Acuna, 245 A.C.A. 423, 53 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1966).64 No cases have been found which directly interpret the evidence section relating
to delinquency proceedings in New York. However, writers who have analyzed the law
seem to agree that any incompetent evidence would be subject to objection. Cf. Isaacs,
The Role Of The Lawyer In Representing Minors In The New Family Court, 12
BusFsAto L. REv. 501, 513 (1963); Paulsen, The New York Family Court Act, 12
BuiF.Ao L. Rv. 420, 432 (1963).
6549 Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1966).
66 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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dence obtained from a search based upon information revealed by minors while
they were illegally detained.6 The Williams court also discussed the admiassibility
of confessions obtained without warning a minor of his constitutional rights:
"ITIhere is no reason why the exclusionary rule should not be equally
applicable to a juvenile, who, by reason of his immaturity, stands in much greater
need of protection from unwarranted police interrogation than an adult."6 8 The
court did not base its decision directly on the section of the New York law which
provides that in juvenile court hearings admissible evidence should be restricted
to competent evidence.6 9 Nevertheless, the case apparently reflects a New York
attitude toward the admission of incompetent evidence directly contrary to the
holdings of the California courts in Castro and Acuna.
An Alternate Proposal
Section 701 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code allows for the
admission of evidence which is useless to the juvenile court. Since incompetent
evidence cannot contribute to the finding of the court, it can be argued that
the law should be amended to exclude it.70 Exclusion would seem particularly
justified in contested cases where a minor is alleged to have committed a crimnal
act and denies the allegations of the petition. 1
The exclusion of incompetent evidence from the juvenile court jurisdictional
hearing would have at least three advantages. First, the possible prejudicial
effect of such evidence would be eliminated.72 In People v. Dorado73 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court discussed the prejudicial nature of an illegally obtained
confession and quoted People v. Parham74 as follows: "Almost invariably a
confession will constitute persuasive evidence of guilt, and it is therefore usually
extremely difficult to determine what part it played in securing the conviction." 75
67 Matter of Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 169, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91, 109 (1966). This is
the only case found where a juvenile court has applied one of the exclusionary rules
unposed on the states by the United States Supreme Court.
68 Id. at 156-57, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 98 (dictum).
69 The decision was based on the court's interpretation of the requirements of due
process and fair treatment. Id. at 169, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
70 In an address to ]uvenile court judges and referees B. E. Witkin recommended
that when illegally obtained evidence or the voluntanness of a confession is involved
the judge should make a preliminary finding and discard it. 'Perhaps, as in the case
of coerced confessions, it would be wiser to give the Constitution a slight edge over
the statute, and exclude at the introduction stage any evidence obtained by a viola-
tion of a constitutional right." Address by B. E. Witkin, m PNocEEDiNcs oF Tm THiao
ANNUAL INsTrrUE FOil JuvN. m CouirT JuDGEs AD REFEm 146 (1964).
71 Most cases in the juvenile court are not contested. For example, one juvenile
court judge has estimated that 99 per cent of the minors brought to the court for
delinquency admit involvement in the offense named. Alexander, Constitutional Rights
in Juvenile Court, 46 A.B.A.J. 1206, 1208 (1960).
72 For a discussion of evidence rules in nonjury trials see Note, Improper Evidence
in Nonjury Trials: Basis for Reversal? 79 HAnv. L. REv. 407 (1965). The writer notes
the advantage of applying the same rules used for jury trials: "Judges are not expected
to be superhuman, as they are when required to render decisions not based in the
smallest degree on admitted inflammatory evidence " Id. at 414.
73 62 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965).
74 60 Cal. 2d 378, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001 (1963).
71 People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 356, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 181, 398 P.2d 361, 373
(1965).
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It would seem that an illegally obtained confession admitted into the juvenile
court could be equally persuasive. Even though the juvenile court judge is
required to disregard incompetent evidence, it is conceivable that his objectivity
nught be adversely affected by his initial exposure to the evidence. Second, if
incompetent evidence were excluded, the juvenile court judge would no longer
be required to sift through all admitted evidence in order to eliminate that
which cannot contribute to hIs finding. Third, the exclusion of incompetent
evidence would be an aid to the appellate court. As one writer has commented:
"Without rules on admissibility the appellate court must either independently
evaluate the evidence and substitute its discretion for that of the trial court or
completely defer to the discretion of the trial court "76
On the other hand, objection to extending the techical rules of evidence to
the juvenile courts is based on the concept that the rules tend to destroy the
essential informal, nonadversary atmosphere of the proceeding.77 However,
section 680 of the Welfare and Institutions Code makes it clear that informality
is not essential when issues are contested in California juvenile courts: "Except
where there is a contested issue of fact or law, the proceedings shall be conducted
in an informal nonadversary atmosphere with a view to obtaining the mamum
cooperation of the minor "78
Important as the informal atmosphere may be, considerations of fairness and
due process would seem to outweigh the admirable motive of sparing a child
the experience of a criminal trial. As one writer has said: "Whatever the court
gains by a less oppressive atmosphere, more will be lost when a child is unjustly
found delinquent." 9
Conclusion
The reason for the admission of evidence into any judicial proceeding is to aid
the trier of fact in ascertaining the truth. Conversely, one compelling reason for the
exclusionary rules of evidence is to keep prejudicial and untrustworthy evidence
from the trier of fact. Both of these propositions are ignored when the evidence
requirements of section 701 of the Welfare and Institutions Code are applied in
the juvenile court. As we have seen, incompetent evidence which may be
potentially untrustworthy and prejudicial is freely admissible if it is relevant and
76 Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-Fundamental Fairness for the Accused in a
Quasi-Cnrmnal Forum, 50 MrNN. L. REv. 653, 684 (1966). In re Castro, 243 A.C.A.
467, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966) is a good example of appellate court involvement in the
evaluation of evidence.
77 See Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized
Justice, 79 HAiv. L. REv:. 775, 795 (1966); Note, The California Juvenile Court, 10
STAN. L. REv. 471, 493 (1958).
78 CAL. WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE; § 680. (Emphasis added.) It can also be observed
that the present California juvenile court law specifically allows representation by
counsel, CAL. Wkvr. & INs5'Ns CODE § 679, and counsel can now object to evidence on
the basis of "materiality" and "relevancy." Doubtless the presence of counsel has a
formalizing effect on the proceedings. The possibility that the 1961 law might lead to
a more formal juvenile court atmosphere was recognized by the juvenile court judges at
their first institute. See JuDrckL CoicuL or CArwonA, Nmzm znt BENNAL RE-
PFoET TO Tm GovoENort AND THE LEisLATnE 75-76 (1963).
79 Welch, supra note 76, at 685.
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